CoinPolice:Detecting Hidden Cryptojacking Attacks with Neural Networks by Petrov, Ivan et al.
CoinPolice: Detecting Hidden Cryptojacking Attacks with
Neural Networks
Ivan Petrov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
ipetrov@cs.msu.ru
Luca Invernizzi
Google
invernizzi@google.com
Elie Bursztein
Google
elieb@google.com
Abstract
Traffic monetization is a crucial component of running most for-
profit online businesses. One of its latest incarnations is cryptocur-
rency mining, where a website instructs the visitor’s browser to
participate in building a cryptocurrency ledger in exchange for a
small reward in the same currency.
In its essence, this practice trades the user’s electric bill, or bat-
tery level, for cryptocurrency. With user consent, this exchange
can be a legitimate funding source – for example, UNICEF is col-
lecting donations in this fashion on thehopepage.org. Regrettably,
this practice also easily lends itself to abuse: in this form, called
cryptojacking, attacks surreptitiously mine in the users browser,
and profits are collected either by website owners or by hackers
that planted the mining script into a vulnerable page.
Understandably, users frown upon this practice and have sought
to mitigate it by installing blacklist-based browser extensions (the
top 3 for Chrome total over onemillion installs), whereas researchers
have devised more robust methods to detect it. In turn, cryptojack-
ers have been bettering their evasion techniques, incorporating
in their toolkits domain fluxing, content obfuscation, the use of
WebAssembly, and throttling. The latter, in particular, grew from
being a niche feature, adopted by only one in ten sites in 2018 [18],
to become commonplace in 2019, reaching an adoption ratio of 58%.
Whereas most state-of-the-art defenses address multiple of these
evasion techniques, none is resistant against all.
In this paper, we offer a novel detection method, CoinPolice,
that is robust against all of the aforementioned evasion techniques.
CoinPolice flips throttling against cryptojackers, artificially varying
the browser’s CPU power to observe the presence of throttling.
Based on a deep neural network classifier, CoinPolice can detect
97.87% of hidden miners with a low false-positive rate (0.74%). We
compare CoinPolice performance with the current state of the art
and show our approach outperforms it when detecting aggressively
throttled miners.
Finally, we deploy Coinpolice to perform the largest-scale cryp-
toming investigation to date, identifying 6700 sites that monetize
traffic in this fashion.
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that are exchanged primarily
without the involvement of trusted parties, such as banks or gov-
ernment institutions. Their ownership, instead, is recorded in dis-
tributed ledgers, maintained by mutually-distrustful parties, called
miners. These ledgers are sprinkled with easy-to-verify but hard-to-
generate cryptographic proofs, intended to make the generation of
forged ledgers extremely computationally expensive, while keeping
the ledger verification cost low. This computational asymmetry is
where the trust among miners is rooted.
Miners incur ongoing power and hardware costs to maintain
these ledgers, so they are compensated with a cryptocurrency re-
ward each time a cryptographic proof is successfully generated.
To reduce these costs and increase profits, miners have focused
on perfecting efficiency, switching general purpose hardware such
as CPUs/GPUs with dedicated integrated circuits (ASICs), which
can outperform CPUs by a factor of up to 10 million. The adoption
of ASICs and the success of the popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin
has lead to an explosion of the computational power behind cryp-
tocurrencies: the Bitcoin network has seen an increase of 750X [2]
between January 2016 and 2019. As cryptocurrency networks adjust
the difficulty of the cryptographic proofs according to the available
computational power, miners without dedicated hardware have
seen their profits turn into losses, and have been thus priced out of
the market.
With the explicit intent to make mining more egalitarian and
increase miner diversity, researchers have created cryptocurrencies
based on ASIC-resistant hash algorithms, with the CryptoNight [31]
algorithm leading the pack in terms of adoption. Cryptonight is
designed to give a competitive advantage to CPUs, thus leveling
the field.
The surge in popularity of Cryptonight-based cryptocurrencies,
such as Monero, in conjunction with the near-native computational
efficiency of WebAssembly, a web scripting language, has opened
the door to in-browser cryptocurrency mining. This practice has
been poised as an alternative to ads, as this is effectively a traffic
monetization mechanism, turning visits into (crypto) cash. Rid-
ing on this new technology, a variety of online services has been
launched to offer easy API to “Monetize Your Business With Your
Users’ CPU Power” (CoinHive’s motto). These services have been
used to collect charity donations with user consent (e.g, Unicef),
or as an alternative to ads (e.g., by Salon.com and ThePirateBay).
Recently, the most popular of these services, CoinHive, has ceased
operations, due to a change in the underlying cryptocurrency.
Regrettably, this monetization mechanism is also ripe for abuse,
as it allows website owners or hackers to effectively spend the
unaware visitor’s power, and the utility bill that comes with it, to
earn cryptocurrency. This type of attack is called cryptojacking (also
known as drive-by-mining), and previous studies [10, 11] estimate
its yearly revenue to be at least 20M USD.
As an example, we quantify the harm that cryptojacking inflicts
to a mobile user in Figure 1. A non-throttled miner running on
the background can shorten the battery life of a latest-generation
high-end mobile device by over 75%1.
Tech-savvy users have sought to mitigate cryptojacking by in-
stalling browser extensions, such as NoCoin [24], that blacklist the
1See Section 2.3.1 for detail on this measurement.
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URLs whence the mining scripts are being loaded. As these solu-
tions are fraught with the usual issues that blacklist face (e.g., their
reactive nature, high upkeep burden, and easy bypassability), re-
searchers have proposed more sophisticated detection mechanisms
ranging from static analysis to behavior classification. To protect
their income, cryptojackers have also been bettering their evasions
toolkit, borrowing techniques from the malware community such
as domain fluxing and content obfuscation. To remain unnoticed,
cryptojackers have also turned to throttling their mining speed:
whereas this practice was relatively uncommon at the start of 2018,
with only one in ten [18] miners using it, our 2019 sample of 200
miners found that throttling has now been adopted by the lion
share of miners2. Moreover, major mining service providers have
included throttling in their "quick start" example code, boosting its
adoption. Unfortunately, we have found these evasion techniques to
be effective in bypassing the state-of-the-art detection mechanisms
(see Figure 10).
In this paper, we present CoinPolice, a code-agnostic cryptojack-
ing detection system. With CoinPolice, we look for in-browser exe-
cution patterns, either of JavaScript (JS) or WebAssembly (WASM)
code, that are repetitive in nature and that actively adjust to the
computational power of the execution environment, so to keep
their CPU time within a target fraction of the available computing
power. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel approach to this
problem. CoinPolice executes web pages in the Chrome browser,
and leverages its Developer Tools API to collect execution traces
and to artificially slow down the execution speed of the site. Having
collected multiple traces at various execution speeds, it then feeds
this data into a deep neural network that will pinpoint any mining
scripts. We test CoinPolice on a dataset comprising of ∼47k samples
to show that it can detect cryptojacking with 97.8% accuracy and
CoinPolice can detect malicious cryptocurrency mining on web
pages with 97.8% true-positive rate and 0.8% false-positive rate.
Finally, we deploy CoinPolice to perform the largest-scale crypto-
mining investigation to date, identifying 6700 sites with functioning
hidden miners.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We show that cryptojackers are relying more on evasion
techniques, such as throttling, and this is rendering state-of-
the-art defenses less effective
• We propose CoinPolice, a novel detection approach based on
the active variation of the execution environment of cryp-
tominers, which is capable of detecting heavily-throttled
miners.
• We perform the largest-scale study of cryptomining preva-
lence to date, to identify 6700 sites with active miners.
• We measure the recovery rate of cryptojacking sites that
were affected by the ceasing of operation of the largest
cryptomining-as-a-service provider, CoinHive.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a succinct overview of key cryptocur-
rency and cryptojacking concepts, sd to make this paper more
accessible to readers unfamiliar with these topics. Feel free to skip.
2H0=50% of mining sites, significance level=0.05, observed proportion=58%, sample
size=200, p=0.023.
2.1 Cryptocurrency Mining
Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that are exchanged amongmutually-
distrustful parties in a peer-to-peer network. They are commonly
being used to pay for goods and services, or as investment vehicles.
In place of a central authority, such as a bank, keeping track of the
ownership of these assets, cryptocurrencies use a distributed ledger,
called the blockchain. As the name implies, this is an ever-growing
sequence of blocks which bundle the transactions happening on the
network. Blocks are interlinked, as each block contains a hash of
the previous one. This chaining makes it extremely computation-
ally expensive to falsify past transactions, as this would require to
generate a hash collision. Additionally, the blockchain is protected
against denial of service attacks and forgeries by proofs of work
(PoW) embedded in each block. These are asymmetrical crypto-
graphic challenges that are hard to compute, so to slow down an
attacker aiming to create alternate chains, but easy to verify, so to
allow the swift detection of forgeries.
A peer-to-peer network of hosts, called miners, maintains the
blockchain, collecting transactions and crystallizing them into new
blocks that get appended to the blockchain. To do so, these hosts
have to compute the expensive PoW in a process called mining.
When a PoW is computed successfully and a block is generated, the
miner responsible is rewarded with some amount of cryptocurrency.
The difficulty of PoWs is dynamic and varies with the number of
miners, so to allow the block generation rate constant.
The generation of a valid block is a winner-take-all horse race:
the miner that solves the PoW first is rewarded, and the rest get
nothing. The reward can be substantial: for Bitcoin, the current
reward is 12.5 bitcoins, which equals $65.025 [3]. As the probability
to win this race decreases with the network size, some miners have
opted to organize into mining pools. When one of the participants
wins the horse race, the pool collects the reward, takes a cut and
distributes the rest to the pool participants, according to the number
of contributed shares.
2.2 CPU Mining
The competitive nature of mining has pushed the miners to seek
the bleeding edge of performance. Professional miners have moved
from mining on general purpose CPUs to the more adept to batch
parallelization GPUs, then opting for specialized programmable
hardware (FPGA), to finally produce single-purpose integrated cir-
cuits (ASICs) that are capable of mining faster than 10 million CPUs.
This race to performance has increased the PoW difficulty, decreas-
ing the probability of payoffs for miners that remained on CPUs.
As the power/hardware cost to mine remain constants, this race
has priced CPU miners out of the market.
ASIC mining has raised the cost to enter the mining market,
reducing the number of agents operating in the market. As this
poses a threat to the decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies, re-
searchers have devised PoW algorithms that give a competitive
advantage to CPU mining, allowing these smaller miners to be
profitable again. One of the most popular is CryptoNight [31]. This
algorithm requires large amounts of random-access memory reads
from a two-megabyte array, called a scratchpad. This array fits in
the extremely-fast L3 cache of modern CPUs, but it poses a con-
siderable challenge to ASIC mining, as ASICs are ill-suited to hold
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large arrays. GPU mining is also impacted, as L3 cache is faster
than the typical memory used on GPUs, GDDR5.
2.3 In-Browser Mining
In-browser mining is the idea of mining cryptocurrencies directly
in web pages, through JS or WASM code. It was first introduced in
2011 to mine Bitcoin [14] but, as this cryptocurrency uses an ASIC-
friendly PoW algorithm, it quickly became pointless, as the gener-
ated revenue approached zero. In-browser mining bounced back
from obsolescence and into profitability due to two technologies:
the introduction of ASIC-resistant currencies, such as Monero [21]
which uses CryptoNight under its hood, and the proliferation of
WASM (announced in 2015), which allows for more efficient in-
browser scripting.
The first to introduce in-browser mining as-a-service was Coin-
hive [5]. This service consisted of a mining pool coupled with an
easy-to-deploy mining script that just needed to be copied into a
web page source code. Soon, new competitors entered this new
market, including Crypto-Loot [8], and CoinImp [7], poising in-
browser mining as-a-service as an traffic-monetization alternative
to ads.
2.3.1 Impact on battery life The harm inflicted on cryptojacking
victims depends on the hardware used in the attack, and the con-
text. For desktops and plugged-in laptops/mobile devices, the harm
consists mainly of an increased electric bill, lower performance,
and heat. This attack is more harmful to users with mobile devices
running on battery power, as it shortens the battery life span and
eventually causes the device to shut down.
We quantify this latter effect in Figure 1. For this experiment,
we run a high-end phone (released in 2018) in a variety of con-
figurations and measure the power drawn from the battery, so to
estimate the battery life span. We ran a total of nine configurations:
1 device is idle with its screen turned on, 2 same, but the Chrome
browser is open on a site (thehopepage.org) with no mining oc-
curring, 2 same, but the browser is reloading the page every 30
seconds, and 3-9 the opened site is mining at different throttling
levels3. We run each configuration for thirty minutes, measuring
the battery level through ADB commands at the beginning and end
of the run. The results show that a miner running at full speed can
severely reduce the battery life span to less than four hours on a
full charge, but even a 10% throttling level can reduce the battery
life span significantly.
Our empirical results show, then, that heavily-throttled cryp-
tojacking causes almost the same level of mobile users’ harm as
full-speed mining. This is because the mobile device is never idle
when mining, and as such it cannot enter its most power-efficient
states.
We note several confounding variables affect these measure-
ments, such as background activity, and the device temperature. In
particular, the latter increases swiftly under heavy mining load: for
example, it rose 11.3◦C (from 26.3◦C) after ten minutes of full-speed
mining. Eventually, the CPU might slow down its execution speed
3Note that some throttling levels cannot be achieved with the controls given in
thehopepage.org. We injected t code into the page to set these levels.
to avoid overheating, depending on ambient temperature and the
device cooling capability.
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Figure 1: Impact on battery life of a cryptojacking attack.
3 Threat model
Intent. The intent of the adversary we are facing is to collect
cryptocurrency payouts through cryptojacking. The non-abusive
form of in-browser mining, where users are informed of the activity
and consent to it, is out of scope. In our evaluation (Section 6), we
take precautions to make sure we never consent to mine when
browsing.
Delivery vectors. Adversaries can insert mining scripts into
websites they own, or into JavaScript/WASM libraries they dis-
tribute to third parties. Additionally, they can hack into vulnerable
websites and third-party libraries to inject mining scripts into them.
Evasion techniques. Adversaries can craft mining scripts in
JavaScript, WebAssembly, or both. They can split the mining logic
into multiple collaborating scripts, and obfuscate their code. They
can execute these scripts in the main browser execution thread for
that page, or in separate threads, such as WebWorkers, SharedWeb-
Workers or ServiceWorkers. They can leverage domain fluxing to
evade blacklists. Finally, they can throttle the execution speed of
their mining scripts to remain undetected.
Motivation. We choose to give our model adversary a vast
toolset of evasion techniques to reflect the capabilities of real at-
tackers. Most of these techniques have been observed in the wild by
previous research: for example, domain fluxing have been observed
in [18], the use of WebAssembly in [32], and code obfuscation
in [19].
The use of throttling is relatively new in the ecosystem, at it has
only been measured by one previous study [18], to be in use by
only 11.36% of mining scripts.
As a preliminary measurement of the incidence of throttling in
miners in March 2019, we have collected 200 URLs of sites that use
the most popular mining service at the time, CoinHive [5]. We did
so by querying a public search engine that indexes website source
code, PublicWWW [26]. Then, we visited each page with Chrome
to identify the mining script and extract the throttling logic to
identify the throttling level. We have chosen to do this preliminary
measurement without leveraging CoinPolice, so not to be biased
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by its detection. We observe in that the lion share of websites have
adopted throttling, and 8.5% are throttling aggressively (that is, less
than 25% of computing power is used to mine). The peak at the
30% throttling rate is likely caused by this value being the default
in CoinHive’s quick-start tutorial. We will leverage Coinpolice to
expand this analysis to other mining libraries in section 6.
Throttling level, extracted from code (% of CPU used)
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Figure 2: Distribution of throttling levels in a random sam-
ple of 200 CoinHive scripts.
4 Related Work
Since the surge of cryptojacking in 2017, researchers have proposed
several methods to detect and mitigate it. In this section, we cate-
gorize and summarize these proposals, along with their advantages
and disadvantages. See Table 1 for a summary.
Static detection. The first solutions to combat cryptojacking are
based on blacklisting, so to prevent the URLs of mining pools and
proxy services from being loaded. These solution are usually offered
in the form of browser extensions, such as NoCoin [24], AntiMiner
[1], MinerBlock [20]. Incidentally, blacklists are the only detection
mechanism that has been adopted by a significant number of users,
with more that one million total installs for the top three extensions.
Blacklist-based approaches, however, are fraught with drawbacks:
they can easily be bypassed by domain/URL fluxing, as they are
reactive in nature, and because of it they incur an high upkeep
burden. Perhaps because of the popularity of these blacklists, over
80% of cryptojackers [18] are using domain/URL fluxing.
These limitations challenge the viability of blacklist-based ap-
proaches in the long term, as acknowledged by Chromium devel-
opers [4]. In fact, the effectiveness of blacklists is already declining:
Hong et al. [11] note that blacklists are updated every ten days on
average, which is less frequent than the churn rate of cryptojacking
domains.
A more advanced static detection approach has been proposed in
MineSweeper [18], which used statically analyzes WASM instruc-
tions to identify loops which have a high number of XOR, shift,
and rotate operations. As the authors state, “in the future, cyber-
criminals may well decide to sacrifice profits and highly obfuscate
their cryptomining Wasm modules to evade detection. In that case,
the previous algorithm is not sufficient.” For this, they propose to
monitor CPU-cache events, which we will discuss in the next sec-
tion. Unfortunately, the authors do not provide the classification
performance for MineSweeper.
Finally, Saad et al. [28] propose to detect cryptojacking by clus-
tering similar JS code. To do so, they apply the fuzzy C-means
clustering algorithm to code-complexity features extracted from a
reconstructed control-flow graph. Although the authors claim a 96%
accuracy and 3.3% false positives, it is unclear how this approach is
scalable, as it was tested on only eight cryptojacking scripts, and
code obfuscation and WASM were not considered.
Dynamic hardware-based detection. This class of detection
approaches aims to profile the execution of cryptomining code at
the CPU level, using the hardware performance counters (HPCs)
included in modern CPUs. These counters are CPU registries that
keep a tally of internal CPU events, such as the number of executed
cycles, cache misses, branch prediction exceptions, so to provide
developers with accurate metrics on the performance of their code.
As CryptoNight is highly optimized to fit the L3 cache of modern
CPUs, the intuition is that its execution will be detectable when
analyzing a timeseries of HPC events.
As this approach is not open source, we have implemented this
approach to the best of our abilities, so to compare the effectiveness
of CoinPolice with it and evaluate it fairly. Our improvements of
this approach over the state of the art includes adding a deep-
learning based classifier in place of hard-coded rules, and reporting
classification performance numbers.
This class of detection approaches has several drawbacks: as mul-
tiple processes/threads are scheduled on the same CPU, the HPC
values only give an aggregate view of the activities that are hap-
pening on the host. This impedes the detection of throttled miners,
as their activity can become indistinguishable from a WASM-based
game, video player, or CPU-intensive 3d visualization. This ap-
proach also poses scalability challenges: the aggregation that HPC
impose impedes parallelization on the same CPU/host, and the
most prominent cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services and
Google Cloud, prevent their clients from accessing HPC values.
Dynamic browser-based detection. The most active area of
research is centered on profiling the execution of cryptojacking
scripts and detect their behavior. Our approach, CoinPolice, also
falls into this class. Twomain categories of approaches have emerged:
detecting anomalous timeseries of specific WASM instructions, and
profiling the overall browser execution.
The former approach has been followed by SEISMIC [32], and
CMTracker [11]. In the former, WASM code is augmented with in-
line counters that tally the execution count of five opcodes (i32.add,
i32.and, i32.shl, i32.shr_u and i32.xor), incurring an execution over-
head of 100%. These features are then fed into a support-vector
machine classifier. The authors claim a 98% accuracy, but it is un-
clear if this approach is feasible at scale, as it has only been tested on
twelve WASM scripts. Such an approach is likely to be vulnerable
to obfuscation, or to splitting the mining execution over multiple
collaborating JS/WASM scripts.
In CMTracker, the authors select nine JS function names as
signatures (such as cryptonight_hash, or crypto) and compute
their total execution time. If a threshold of 10% is surpassed, the
script is classified as mining. Secondly, they identify repeating
function call sequences, and classify the script as mining if more
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that 30% of the execution time is spent in one of these sequences.
Unfortunately, the authors do not report classification performance
values. Such an approach does not consider WASM mining, which
accounts for the vast majority of the miners we have encountered.
Plus, it can be evaded by a combination of throttling and minimal
code obfuscation (or even minification).
The related work more relevant to ours is OUTGUARD [16],
which computes a series of behavioral features to then classify
them through an SVM (support vector machine). These features
include the number of web workers, the number of workers exe-
cuting identical tasks, websocket creation count, specific function
names (such as CryptonightWasmWrapper.hash), the number of
messages sent to WebWorkers, and the number of MessageLoop
events. The key differences between Outguard and our work stem
from our design decision not to rely on rely on 1 signature match-
ing on the attacker code, which could be obfuscated, or 2 features
designed to catch aggressive mining, such as the number of web
workers running identical tasks. These choices allow Coinpolice
to be agnostic to the implementation details of the mining, thus
increasing its robustness. Additionally, Coinpolice’s detection is
not skewed toward catching aggressive miners so to be able to
better detect heavily-throttled miners, which represent a growing
trend in this space. OUTGUARD does not provide classification
performance data at varying mining throttling levels.
5 Detection Algorithms
As the majority of related work either do not provide classifier
performance data or a functional open-source implementation, we
have chosen to design and implement to the best of our ability
several classifiers that replicate the strategies they use. These clas-
sifiers are not a perfect reproduction of related work: instead, we
have opted to implement similar features and process them through
a deep neural network classifier. We do so to push each detection
strategy to the limit, and offer a fairer comparison between CoinPo-
lice and other strategies, as deep-learning detectors typically match
or outperform more traditional approaches.
Specifically, we describe seven cryptojacking detection classi-
fiers: 1 a baseline classifier that only uses an hard-coded 30%
threshold over CPU usage, 2,3 two classifiers based on HPC coun-
ters (respectively using a convolutional and recurrent neural net-
works), 4,5 two classifiers based on JS/WASM function execution
timeseries, and 6,7 two classifier based on the JS/WASM features
and throttling-detection features (one being CoinPolice, and a con-
volutional deep-learning classifier using the same features).
The mapping between classifiers and the features they use is
provided in Table 2.
The overall system design is shown in Figure 3: the input of the
system is a URL, which we crawl with a browser farm of Chrome
browsers. We obtain a log of events that occurred at the system
level and within the browser while the URL was loaded in a tab, and
extract the features described in Section 5.1. Finally, we feed the
features into the classifiers to obtain a verdict from each classifier.
We note that the classifiers 4-7 exclusively use data obtained
from the Chrome DevTools API. As such, they could be executed
both server side or client side. The HPC-based classifiers, instead,
are hardware dependent and susceptible to system noise. As such,
a server-side deployment would be preferable, both for the reduced
complexity and increased signal-to-noise ratio (see Section 5.1.1).
As HPC-based classifiers incur in significant deployment chal-
lenges (see Section 5.1.1) we also chose not to include in our eval-
uation a classifier that uses all features: its deployment would be
challenging, and our results show it would provide no classification
benefits over CoinPolice.
URL Event log Features Verdicts
Browser farm Feature extractor Classifiers
Figure 3: Overall system overview.
5.1 Features
We collect three categories of features: CPU hardware performance
counters, features describing cyclical patterns extracted from JS/WASM
execution traces, and features characterizing the changes in the
same traces in response to active CPU execution speed slowdowns.
We will now describe the concepts underlying these features in de-
tail, and we will discuss their representation in the next subsection.
5.1.1 Features: Hardware-Performance Counters HPCs are coun-
ters embedded into modern CPUs to keep a tally of internal events
that affect the execution performance. The specific counters are
hardware dependent but, generally, they measure the number of
executed cycles, cache misses, and branch prediction exceptions.
Originally, HPCs were provided to developers to surface execution
bottlenecks in their programs. Being implemented in hardware, the
overhead incurred by monitoring HPCs is minimal.
Here, we use HPCs to discriminate benign/malicious execution
thanks to the key property of a mining algorithm designed to give
a competitive advantage to CPU miners, such as CryptoNight –
its memory hardness. For example, CryptoNight requires substan-
tial memory reads (524,288 reads per hash) [31] from a pseudo-
randomly generated array, which is designed to fit on the L3 cache
of modern CPUs. We note that this approach is not specific to Cryp-
toNight, but generalizes to any algorithm that uses the speed of
CPU caches to give a competitive advantage to CPU miners. In
the rest of the paper, we often refer to CryptoNight as it is by far
the most common algorithm used to give this advantage. When
a non-obfuscated, non-throttled version of CryptoNight is being
executed, these memory reads rarely cause L3 cache misses, which
effectively makes CryptoNight-based mining competitive on CPUs.
Limitations.
HPC-based features are highly susceptible to noise introduced
by other processes or threads running on the same host, as they all
share the same CPUs, and compete to store values in their caches,
causing cache misses. Since users encounter cryptojacking miners
while browsing the web, the HPC values will be affected by all open
tabs, severely diminishing the discriminative power of this feature.
Additionally, cryptominers can intentionally cause additional cache
misses to further impede detection, or offer to users compelling
content to keep them on the site longer, which also will compete for
computational resources. Miners that parallelize their activity with
5
Table 1: Related work
Paper Features Classifier Performance
CMTracker [11] JS signatures Hand-crafted rules Not reported
SEISMIC [32] WASM opcode counts Hand-crafted rules 98% accuracy, calculated on 12 samples
MineSweeper [18] Human-assisted static analysis Hand-crafted rules Not reported
Saad et al. [28] Clustering code-complexity features Fuzzy C-means 96% accuracy and 3.3% false positives, calculated on
only 8 samples
OUTGUARD [16] Signatures and behavioral features of
aggressive miners
Support-Vector Machine 97.9% TPR and 1.1% FPR, trained and tested on 30k
samples (10% test split) with no throttiling
randomization.
Coinpolice (this work) Throttling-independent behavior
timeseries
Convolutional neural net-
work
97.8% TPR and 0.74% FPR, trained and tested on 47k
samples (10% test split) with randomized throttling
levels.
Table 2: Features used in each classifier.
Classifier Features
Hardware-
performance
counters
Recurring code
execution
Throttling
detection
HPC CNN ✓ ✗ ✗
HPC RNN ✓ ✗ ✗
JS CNN ✗ ✓ ✗
JS RNN ✗ ✓ ✗
JS CNN ✗ ✓ ✓
JS RNN (CoinPolice) ✗ ✓ ✓
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Figure 4: L3 cache loads/misses (server had 35,840 KB L3
cache size).
WebWorkers to increase the hash rate will also increase the cache-
miss rate (see Figure 4). Finally, HPCs pose practical challenges.
They are hardware dependent, so classification performance will
vary across CPU manufactures and models, and trained models
might not be easily transferable.
5.1.2 Features: Recurring Code Execution Cryptocurrency mining
is innately a repetitive process, where hashes are produced over and
over. This repetition is apparent when looking at JS/WASM stack
traces timeseries. This is exemplified in Figure 5, which shows
a stack trace timeline of a Coinhive mining script collected via
Chrome DevTools [9]. Note that the same set of functions is being
executed repeatedly, with similar sequencing and durations. This
pattern is relatively uncommon in legitimate websites - according
to Hong et al [11], repeating patterns are to be found in up to 5.6%
of a typical page execution time.
Timer Fired
Function Call
Auxiliary Functions
Hash Generation
Durations
Stack 
Depth 
Figure 5: Stack trace timeline for a Coinhive script.
Limitations.This feature categorymay introduce false positives
for JS/WASM heavy sites that perform large amounts of repetitive
computation, such as 3d games, 3d ads, and physics simulations,
where the scene has to be updated periodically (typically, within
the 30-120 times per second range). To discriminate these sites,
we have found the final category of features, throttling detection
features, to be critical.
5.1.3 Features: Throttling Detection Mining in inherently computa-
tionally heavy, and its side effects, such as head and loud fan noise,
are easily noticed by cryptojacking victims. To remain unnoticed
for longer, the majority of miners perform throttling, as we show
in Figure 2 and Figure 11. This reduces the revenue generated by
each victim, but this trade-off is compensated by reaching a broader
audience. To perform throttling, miners keep track of the time spent
on the generation of each hash and introduce microsleep intervals
in their scripts, so to keep the overall execution time under the
throttling threshold.
The idea underlying this last set of features is to use throttling,
this adaptive behavior that is unique to cryptominers, to detect
them. To craft features that capture throttling we introduce a novel
active probing technique: we artificially reduce the amount of CPU
time available to the browser, and we load the site suspected of
mining. By comparing traces with varying levels of CPU slowdowns,
we can identify miners by looking for execution traces where the
overall execution time has not changed. This is because legitimate
websites naturally will require more execution time to render on a
(artificially) less powerful CPU, whereas miners will adapt to the
CPU power, and reduce their hash rate to keep their execution
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time under the throttling threshold. Because throttling is unique to
cryptominers, this technique is capable of discriminating miners
from legitimate websites with highly-repetitive execution patterns.
As a preliminary measurement of this discriminative power, we
have manually analyzed traces of publicly available mining scripts,
selected video streaming services and JS/WASM games, and we
present the results in Figure 6, which shows the relation between a
CPU slowdown rate and the average increase of function execution
time. Interestingly, the more miners leverage threshold to become
unnoticed, the more this behavior becomes evident with this feature.
Note that the rate of increase is not exactly linear due to noises
introduced by execution randomness, especially in the case of 3d
games.
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Figure 6: Function duration increase (bars represent mean,
whiskers – standard deviation).
Limitations. This category of features is only able to detect
throttling. Miners that do not perform throttling, either by mining
a set amount of hashes per second or by mining as fast as possible,
will remain unnoticed. However, we argue that unthrottled miners
can be easily detected by the previous set of features, and rate-
limited miners will have to select a very low hashing rate to remain
unnoticed, as this rate is dictated by the slowest executing device
(i.e., if the miner aims to only use 20% of CPU on all devices and does
not perform active throttling, the slowest device will determine the
hashing rate).
5.2 Data Collection
In this section and the next, we will respectively describe how we
collect the aforementioned features, and how we encode them in
a format that can be digested by our deep-learning classifiers to
produce a verdict.
The input of the overall system are URLs of sites suspected of
cryptojacking. We load each URL into an instance of the Chrome
web browser, which is spawned from scratch for each URL, so to
make sure of the independence of each measurement. We control
these Chrome instances programmatically through puppeteer [27].
Each measurement comprises of four phases. In 1 , we visit
the URL and wait until the browser generates less than 4 network
requests per second, so to ensure the site is fully loaded. Then ( 2 ),
wewait for ten additional seconds to wait for delayedminers to start
working - we chose this particular value because we have found
it to be an upper bound of the miner start delay through manual
experimentation. We then ( 3 ) start our measurement phase, which
lasts for five seconds. During this time, we collect HPC values
through perf [25], and JS/WASM function call log through the
Chrome DevTools API [9].
HPC traces.We collect the following HPC values, with a sam-
pling interval of 10 milliseconds: CPU cycles, instructions, L1 and
L3 cache loads, stores and misses, branch instructions and branch
misses. We reset the HPC counters at the beginning of each interval
so that the collected values are not cumulative.
JS/Wasm Traces.We process the DevTools logs to traces where
each function is described as a tuple ⟨thread id, function name,
source script, line number, column number, call stack depth⟩. The
traces correspond to the JS/WASM function call log in the main
execution thread, and any WebWorker threads. Finally ( 4 ), we
produce an event log with the HPC values and JS/WASM function
calls (identified with the tuple ⟨function name, source script, line
number, column number, call stack depth⟩), to pass on to our feature
extractor.
We visit each URL five times, using DevTools to artificially slow-
ing down the CPU available to the site. DevTools emulates slow-
downs by introducing short delays during rendering and JS/WASM
execution. The slowdown rates we use are 1x (i.e., no slowdown),
2x, 4x, 8x and 16x, which produce a total of five traces per web
page.
5.3 Data Representation
In this section, we describe how we encode our feature in a format
that can be processed by a deep-learning classifier, where each
feature has a fixed position in the input array of the classifier. We
note that each classifier will only receive a specific set of features:
for example, the classifiers that are based exclusively on HPC values
will not be given the JS/Wasm data.
Since the collected HPC values are a fixed set, we represent
them as multivariable timeseries where for each counter we have
a separate timeseries of its values. Each frame of this timeseries
corresponds to a collection interval. JS/WASM stack traces are
also represented as multivariable timeseries, as shown in Figure 7.
However, we cannot use the same approach as HPC values, as each
website has its unique set of functions.
Thread 2
a).
Choose 2
threads
Trace 2x
Trace 1x
Thread 1
Function trace d).
Concatenateb).Choose top 5
functions
c).
Create timeseries
Figure 7: Timeseries creation.
We first collect the five traces obtained from visiting a single URL
with different CPU slowdown rates (step a in Figure 7). Each of these
traces contains a log of the activity in the main execution thread,
plus any spawned WebWorker. If at most one WebWorker has been
spawned, we group the main thread trace with the WebWorker (if
any), and we proceed to the next step. If more than one WebWorker
has been spawned, we create a trace group for each WebWorker, by
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duplicating the main thread. These trace groups are passed to the
classifier independently: this allows us to use the classifier verdict
to pinpoint which WebWorker (or main thread) is likely responsible
for the mining activity.
For each trace group, we identify the five functions that have
the highest cumulative execution time (step b in Figure 7), and
we discard the rest. We generate a function timeseries for each
function, which encapsulates its call times and call durations.
Finally, we process these function timeseries to create a final
multivariate timeseries (step c in Figure 7). Each timeseries is cre-
ated using a time-sliding window that traverses a trace one step at
a time and creates feature vectors (Figure 8). In our experiments we
use a sliding window size of 2 seconds, and a step of 15 milliseconds.
Feature Vector
Function
Trace
Durations Delays
Sliding Window
Timeseries
Figure 8: Timeseries for a single function trace.
To better detect the mining of the large family of SHA-256-based
cryptocurrencies (i.e., not based on CryptoNight), such as JSEc-
oin [13], we also create a separate timeseries describing calls to
the WebCrypto browser module, which is an API to execute se-
lected cryptographic primitives efficiently. Specifically, we log calls
to DoDigest(). This timeseries is created using the same sliding-
window technique described above.
5.4 Classifiers
As you may recall from Section 5, we implement a total of seven
cryptojacking classifiers. All these classifiers, but the baseline one,
are implemented in Keras [15], with a TensorFlow [30] backend.
We note that all classifiers in related work are not based on neural
networks: as we implemented their strategy, we opted to upgrade
them to a deep-learning classifier for a fairer comparison. For the
classification task we used two architectures: recurrent networks,
and convolutional ones.
We show our recurrent architecture in Figure 9a). It contains
two bidirectional Gated Recurrent Unit layers and employs batch
normalization [12]. The output from these layers is sent to a final
fully-connected layer with 32 neurons and a 20% dropout [29]. Such
an architecture is commonly in use for text classification tasks.
Our convolutional architecture is shown in Figure 9b. The vari-
ous parameters in the figures have been selected through hyperpa-
rameter optimization.
6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of CoinPolice and
perform a large scale investigation on Alexa’s top 1Million websites
aimed to find active cryptojacking sites.
6.1 Dataset
Our dataset contains 47k samples, and is roughly evenly split be-
tween cryptojacking and non-cryptojacking samples. We collected
GRU (64)
BatchNorm
Dense (32)
Dropout (0.2)
GRU (64)
GRU (64) GRU (64)
(a) Recurrent.
BatchNorm
LeakyReLU
CNN (128 x 3)
Dense (32)
Dropout (0.2)
BatchNorm
LeakyReLU
CNN (256 x 3)
BatchNorm
LeakyReLU
CNN (512 x 3)
(b) Convolutional.
Figure 9: Classifier architectures.
the legitimate samples at random from the Alexa top million sites,
excluding sites that appear in public cryptomining blacklists. To this
dataset we added hand-picked video service and t/WASM games, so
to introduce hard samples (that is, benign samples that are harder
to discriminate from cryptojacking samples).
To create the cryptojacking dataset, we have also manually col-
lected several variants of 23 mining libraries. We then proceeded to
visit sites picked from the same Alexa collection mentioned above
(but not the same ones), and we performed a local injection of the
mining library into the browser, as to emulate a cryptojacking site.
This data-augmentation approach lets us generate a large dataset
where we control the miner throttling level, which we randomized
to diversify the collected data. We added to this dataset a selection
of active cryptojacking sites. We collected these by loading sites
that were blacklisted for cryptojacking, and manually checking that
the mining code was being executed.
To increase the robustness of our classifier, we have augmented
the data in our 47k-samples dataset. Specifically, we augment the
data in two ways. First, we created additional training samples
by swapping the main thread with a WebWorker thread. We do
so to prevent the classifier from learning that mining typically
happens in a WebWorker thread, as attackers could evade detection
by moving the computation process across threads. Second, we
created samples with randomly shifted function call times, with
shifts up to 25% of the trace length. We have done so to emulate an
evasion technique where the attacker introduces random delays in
the execution pattern to evade detection. Some of the related work,
such as Outguard, are vulnerable to this attack. The reason behind
leveraging data augmentation is to generate sufficient samples with
advanced evasion techniques for our classifiers to learn them.
6.2 Classifier Evaluation
Each classifier was trained for 100 epochs by an Adam stochastic
optimizer [17], and we performed hyperparameter tuning to obtain
the best performance. After training, we have chosen the best clas-
sifiers based on their validation accuracy and evaluated them on
our test data.
Table 3 shows training and validation accuracy of best classifiers
and their evaluation on test data. It also shows false negative (FNR)
and false positive rates (FPR) evaluated on test data.
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Table 3: Accuracy of trained classifiers.
Classifier Train
acc.
Val.
acc.
Test
acc.
Test
FNR
Test
FPR
HPC CNN 0.9746 0.8904 0.8865 0.0195 0.2406
HPC RNN 0.9706 0.9701 0.9717 0.0299 0.0261
JS CNN (No Slowdown) 0.9097 0.8361 0.8441 0.0799 0.2478
JS RNN (No Slowdown) 0.8637 0.8705 0.8648 0.0545 0.2355
JS CNN 0.9873 0.9783 0.9734 0.0379 0.0131
JS RNN (CoinPolice) 0.9830 0.9779 0.9781 0.0353 0.0074
The results show that convolutional classifier based on HPC
shows an unacceptable amount of overfitting, while a recurrent
classifier shows high test accuracy rate. But it still shows visible
signs of overfitting such as validation accuracy oscillations with a
high amplitude (accuracy could drop below 93%).
The results also show the importance of an artificial CPU slow-
down for detecting miners that throttle. Without features corre-
sponding to such slowdowns test accuracy drops below 87% due to
high false positive rates (more than 23%).
Both JS based classifiers (with CPU slowdowns) show higher
values of each accuracy type. JS CNN starts overfitting (validation
accuracy starts to decrease) after 40 epochs. JS RNN classifier is
more stable than JS CNN and shows less overfitting by checking
on validation data.
To evaluate the ability to detect throttledminers we have checked
true positives on a separate test set consisting of ∼22k mining
samples with different throttling rates. We have also evaluated an
existing threshold-based classifier presented in [11] that detects
functions that use more than 30% of the CPU time. It’s important to
note that this data set was collected after the Monero hard fork hap-
pened at the 9th of March [22]. Thus, it includes fewer miner types
since several miners, including Coinhive, have stopped working
[6].
The results are shown in Figure 10. This figure shows true pos-
itive rates for JS RNN and HPC RNN classifiers and for the 30%
threshold-based classifier.
Experiments have shown that the JS-based classifier is able to
detect silent miners (⩽ 30% of the CPU) with the smallest amount
of false positives (0.74%).
Even though the threshold-based classifier shows 100% true
positive rate on heavy miners, it starts to drop instantly on miners
that use ⩽ 25% of the CPU. Results also show that the classifier
based on hardware performance counters is not able to correctly
classify miners that use ⩽ 15% of the CPU.
6.3 Investigation
We have performed a large scale investigation on Alexa’s top 1
Million websites. We have opened each website and have collected
traces of JS and WASM calls using Chrome DevTools API [9] and
the puppeteer framework [27].
Data was collected using 11 servers with ∼16 CPUs each. We
have collected ∼2.2 Tb of zipped data during the period between
29th of December 2018 and 23rd of January 2019.
It should be noted that in order to increase sample collection
speed we spoofed the navigator hardwareConcurrency object to
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Figure 10: Detection of throttled miners.
return only 1 CPU thread available. This object allows JS to get the
number of logical processors. Such spoofing allowed us to profile
multiple web pages in parallel. So if we would profile several miners
at the same time they would use only a single thread and would
not consume all threads available simultaneously.
To reduce the number of potential false positives during the
investigation, we didn’t use model on samples that were using
almost 0% of the CPU, since they are obviously not miners. Also
we didn’t click any buttons on web pages since we only searched
for malicious mining without a user permission.
The results of our investigation show that 447 websites from
the Alexa’s top 1 Million list are mining cryptocurrency, which we
manually confirmed.
Our approach also allows to show how much real CPU time
is used for mining process since data contains information about
function durations. Figure 11 shows the results of our investigation.
The results show that even though 50% of all miners in Alexa’s list
are using ⩾ 80% of the CPU there are miners that are very silent
(⩽ 30% of the CPU).
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Figure 11: CPU usage by mining scripts.
We have also checked CoinPolice on URLs that contained code
patterns corresponding to well-known mining scripts. We have
collected these URLs with patternmatching using PublicWWW [26]
on 31st of January 2019. The Appendix 9 shows patterns that were
used in the search. It’s important to note that we only considered
web pages that could be successfully opened.
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Tables 4 and 5 show the number of pages for each mining script
and also show the results of CoinPolice classification. It’s important
to note that Table 4 shows the subset of websites presented in Table
5 that are in the Alexa Top 1M list.
Table 4: Miner detection on PublicWWW data (Top 1M).
Miner Top 1M Actively mining Active %
Coinhive 159 92 57.9%
JSEcoin 103 4 3.9%
Crypto-Loot 43 18 41.9%
Mineralt 21 8 38.1%
CoinImp 20 15 75%
OMINE 13 10 76.9%
Perfekt 12 8 66.7%
WebMine 4 3 75%
WebMinePool 3 1 33.3%
CoinNebula 2 2 100%
Minero 2 2 100%
Total 382 163 42.7%
Unique 376 157 41.8%
Table 5: Miner detection on PublicWWW data
Miner All samples Mining Percentage
Coinhive 10771 5222 48.5%
JSEcoin 1939 131 6.8%
CoinImp 785 194 24.7%
Crypto-Loot 733 441 60.2%
OMINE 305 192 63%
Mineralt 230 96 41.7%
Perfekt 151 119 78.8%
Minero 121 102 84.3%
WebMinePool 69 40 58%
CoinNebula 61 39 63.9%
WebMine 37 20 54.1%
Total 15202 6596 43.4%
Unique 14891 6410 43%
During this investigation we have found 6410 mining websites
157 of which are in the Alexa’s top 1 Million list. Table 5 also shows
that 186 websites are using several miner types simultaneously.
The results show that only 43% of websites, that contain string
patterns corresponding to miners, are actually mining cryptocur-
rency. There are several possible explanations behind this.
First, as we found by a manual check, a lot of websites do not
run miners because mining script could not be loaded successfully.
This could be because proxies for servers serving mining scripts
are changed in a constant manner to evade being blocked by ISPs
or by mining blocking software on the user side. So hosts of mining
websites need to constantly update code for miner loading.
Second, some scripts could have been inserted only once though
a vulnerability on a website and haven’t been updated after this.
Third, some websites are asking for user permission to start
mining, so they do contain mining code but they do not run it right
away. For example, this is the case for JSEcoin, since it requires
a manual change in the official script to disable user permission
check. So only 6.8% of them are mining maliciously.
Forth, Monero cryptocurrency network introduced a hard-fork
and updated CryptoNight algorithm in October 2018 [23]. These
could become a problem for someone who was using self-hosted
mining pools on personal servers to avoid usingwell-known proxies
or to avoid commission from official pools (i.e. 30% from Coinhive).
So all of them needed to update mining scripts, since old scripts
got deprecated.
Combining these 2 investigations together we have found 6700
mining websites 447 of which are in the Alexa’s top 1 Million list.
We also have checked our system on data from previous large scale
investigation shown in [11]. Their dataset consisted of 2770 mining
websites (2580 unique domains) and was collected at the beginning
of the 2018. Our experiments have shown that only 381 of them are
still mining cryptocurrency (113 of which are in the Alexa’s top 1
Million list in January 2019).
To quantify the impact of the Coinhive’s discontinuation [6]
and to capture how cryptomining sites react to big changes in the
environment, we have re-scanned all Coinhive URLs that were
originally found by CoinPolice. The experiment took place 3 weeks
after the discontinuation, so websites’ owners would have enough
time to replace Coinhive with another working miner.
The results are shown in Table 6. Experiments have shown that
more than 98% of mining URLs have stopped mining, i.e CoinHive
has stopped functioning and has not been replaced with a new
miner, making the recovery rate of cryptojacking websites is ∼1.2%.
The are multiple possible explanations for this low recovery rate:
the initial miner might have been surreptitiously placed on the site
through a vulnerability, the owner did not notice that CoinHive
ceased operations, or the profit obtained from cryptojacking is not
notable enough to warrant replacing the mining logic.
Table 6: CoinHive’s discontinuation impact
Date URLs Reachable Mining Recovery
28th of March 5222 4863 66 1.26%
11th of April 5222 4859 61 1.17%
18th of April 5222 4845 63 1.21%
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss limitations of our approach and potential
evasion techniques that can be used by miners to defeat detection.
We identify several limitations in the way we collect data. These
limitations are the result of a trade-off of the resources we spend
on a single site and the number of sites processed. As such, they
can be mitigated.
Timing. We only profile each website for 5 seconds (+10 sec-
ond delay before profiling) we could possibly miss cryptojacking
websites that start mining after more than 15 seconds. The crypto-
jacker faces a trade-off too here, as this delay will indeed reduce
the chance of detection but it will impact the profits generated.
Profiling. As we use the Chrome DevTools API we could miss
websites that detect the usage of DevTools. This can be mitigated
by patching Chrome to evade these detections.
Functions in timeseries. We only include the top five func-
tions in terms of CPU usage per thread in our timeseries. So if a
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websiteâĂŹs owner implements additional logic in the minerâĂŹs
thread, and this logic is computationally heavier than the miner,
then we could miss mining behavior. We manually checked the top
mining families for this behavior, and we found that none of them
contains it. Also, the number of functions included in the timeseries
is configurable.
We envision several ways in which CoinPolice could be evaded.
Per-request randomization of JS/WASM code. A web page
may randomize all function names at each page load, so we will
not be able to compare function durations in traces corresponding
to different CPU throttling rates. This behavior, if adopted by cryp-
tojackers, might become a feature in itself. If so, CoinPolice could
be reformulated to identify recurring code execution without using
the function names, such as by convolving the flame graphs.
Randomized function delays. Miners may introduce random
delays between function calls to evade the throttling-detection
features. We have considered this attack in our training, test and
validation data that we presented: through data augmentation, we
randomly shifted the execution of function calls. However, we were
unable to check our performance on real data, as none of the existing
miners implement this technique.
Randomized function durations.Miners also can change func-
tion durations depending on the CPU performance, so these dura-
tions would not be the same in the presence of an artificial CPU
slowdown. This technique would effectively evade the throttling-
detection features, yet we argue it would ultimately be detrimental
to the cryptojacker. This is because on sufficiently slow devices
the mining speed will have to use 100% of the available CPU, thus
becoming very noticeable.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we present CoinPolice – a system for hidden cryp-
tojacking detection. We have identified features that can be used
to detect malicious cryptocurrency mining on web pages. We also
developed a new active probing technique that can detect hidden
miners that are trying to evade detection by reducing their CPU
usage.
Based on the identified features and a deep neural network clas-
sifier we have developed a system called CoinPolice that can detect
97.87% of hidden miners with a low false positive rate (0.74%). A
performance comparison against the current state of the art has
shown that CoinPolice outperforms it in detecting highly throttled
miners with lower amount of false alarms.
We have evaluated CoinPolice on existing miners and have per-
formed a large scale investigation and have found 6700 mining
websites 447 of which are in the AlexaâĂŹs Top 1 Million list. We
have also checked mining websites found by pattern matching in
the PublicWWW base. Our results show that only 43% of these
websites are successfully mining cryptocurrency.
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